




In a volume comparing education law and policy across a variety of jurisdictions, the case 
of Ireland offers much food for thought. In spite of having one of the oldest and most 
detailed constitutional provisions concerning education in Europe (dating back to 1937), 
Ireland is in truth a relative newcomer to the area of education law, having regulated the 
area of education almost entirely at a policy level until the late 1990s. Since then, a range 
of controversies have arisen from the interaction between the constitutional framework 
concerning education and religion and the newly enacted legislative framework, coupled 
with extensive litigation surrounding the rights of children with special educational 
needs. More recently, tensions have arisen from the increasing mismatch between 
Ireland’s overwhelmingly denominational education system and a more multicultural 
and secular society. This contribution aims to elucidate the basic legal structure of the 
Irish primary and secondary education system, and to highlight the central points of 
controversy and concern that have arisen in recent years. 
 
The structure of schooling  
 
The Irish education system, particularly at primary level, is something of a curiosity by 
international standards. Although primary schools in Ireland are referred to as ‘National 
Schools’, as a matter of fact they are in no way national or public. What would, in other 
countries, be referred to as the public school system is, in Ireland, a system of privately 
owned and managed schools that are funded by the State. These schools are 
overwhelming owned and managed by religious denominations, with the small remainder 
owned and managed by organizations committed to the provision of a multi-
denominational alternative. Only a handful (less than 1%) are actually State-owned and 
managed. In effect, the State has outsourced its primary education function, with each 
school having a ‘Patron’ (most often a local Bishop, but occasionally a private company or 
vocational education committee) who appoints a board of management to manage the 
school on his or its behalf. The roots of this system are historical and pre-date the 1937 
Constitution quite considerably; they can be traced to the very beginning of the system of 
State funded education in Ireland in 1833 and a document known as the ‘Stanley Letter’ 
(Mawhinney 2009, 17-22). Upon independence in 1922, the newly formed State had 
neither the desire nor the resources to disturb this arrangement, while the religious 
denominations were content to retain the influential role given to them through the 
primary education system. 
 
Accordingly, when Eamonn de Valera and his advisors came to draft the educational 
provisions of the 1937 Constitution, one of their greatest concerns was the maintenance 
of the status quo – so much so that when de Valera was presented with a draft of Article 
42.4 that referred to a duty on the State to ‘provide free primary education’, he altered 
this to ‘provide for’ in his own handwriting (Constitution Review Group 1996, 344; Farry 
1996, 13). This was intended to keep the State at one remove from the actual provision of 
education, and copper fasten the arrangement whereby primary education was funded by 
the State but managed and delivered by religious denominations. Article 44.2.4° further 
reinforced this arrangement by expressly authorizing State funding of denominational 
schools on a non-discriminatory basis. In Crowley v Ireland (1980), Mr. Justice Kenny 
in the Supreme Court confirmed that the effect of the phrase ‘provide for’ in Article 42.4 
‘is that the State is to provide the buildings, to pay the teachers who are under no 
contractual duty to it but to the manager or trustees, to provide means of transport to the 
school if this is necessary to avoid hardship, and to prescribe minimum standards.’ The 
historical system established in 1833 and constitutionalized in 1937 has endured to this 
day. As of 2019, the great majority (89%) of primary schools are Catholic denominational 
schools; most of the remainder are under the control of either one of the Protestant 
denominations or Educate Together, a multi-denominational education provider 
(Mawhinney 2009, 50). At the time of writing, there are two Muslim schools and one 
Jewish school. 
 
At secondary level, the majority (53%) of schools are also privately owned but State-
funded schools, many of which are owned by religious denominations. However, there is 
far greater diversity at secondary level, with a significant number of these private schools 
being owned by non-religious entities such as private companies providing commercial 
private education, as well as a greater level of direct State involvement, with 47% of 
secondary schools being owned and run by the State, and in that sense being more in line 
with international concepts of ‘public’ education. These types of school include vocational 
schools, which are State owned, run by statutory local vocational educational committees, 
and non-denominational in their ethos (although religion is included as one subject in the 
curriculum); and community and comprehensive schools, which are State-owned schools 
which are run in conjunction either with religious denominations or local boards of 
management. A small number (less than 10%) of secondary schools charge fees, but 
nonetheless still receive State funding to cover core costs such as teachers’ salaries (Flynn 
2011a). In order to cater for the geographically-dispersed Protestant community, an 
arrangement was put in place in the 1960s whereby additional funding was given to 
Protestant boarding schools at secondary level (of which there are approximately 20), so 
that members of that community could still benefit from free secondary education in a 
denominational environment without being hindered by cost or distance. During the 
financial crisis that followed the banking crash of 2008, cuts to this funding led to some 
controversy and debate as to whether the Constitution requires the provision of such 
funding in order to protect the religious freedom of the Protestant community, or 
alternatively prohibits the provision of such funding as a breach of the constitutional 
prohibition on non-discrimination (Daly, 2010). 
 
At a macro level, the control of schooling in Ireland rests centrally with the Minister for 
Education, who has responsibility for curriculum design, school recognition and 
inspection, and funding allocation. However, as will be seen below, individual school 
patrons and boards of management are given significant autonomy in the areas of teacher 
employment, pupil admission, curriculum delivery and use of resources. Educational 
functions are not devolved on a structural basis to local government in Ireland as they are 
in, for example, the UK (where Local Education Authorities are legally responsible for 
educational provision); however, 35% of secondary schools are operated under the 
patronage and management of local vocational education committees established under 
the Vocational Education Act 1930. 
 
The legal framework  
 
The Irish Constitution of 1937 contains extensive provisions (by constitutional standards) 
regarding education, both in Article 42 (Education) and Article 44 (Religion). Article 42 
provides that the State shall provide for free primary education and ensure that every 
child receives a certain minimum education; but its main focus is on parental rights and 
freedom of choice. It emphasizes the right of parents to provide for the religious, moral, 
intellectual, physical and social education of their children, and protects the right to 
establish private schools and to educate children at home, while expressly prohibiting a 
State monopoly in education provision. Article 44 builds on this by providing that State 
funding for denominational schools must be non-discriminatory, and protecting the right 
of children to attend a school receiving public funds without attending religious 
instruction at that school. The core right of the child to receive free primary education 
received comparatively little attention until the 1990s, when the High Court in 
O’Donoghue v Minister for Health (1993) interpreted Article 42.4 as guaranteeing that 
right to all children, including the most severely disabled, with the educational provision 
to be varied to meet the needs of the child. This led to a deluge of litigation, raising 
difficulty issues regarding the power of the courts to enforce a right that has extensive 
implications for the allocation of public resources (O’Mahony 2006, 156-178). 
 
Nonetheless, constitutional litigation brought about a significant improvement in the 
provision made for children with special educational needs, showing that there are 
distinct advantages associated with having a justiciable constitutional right to education. 
However, some of the administrative issues brought to light by this litigation also 
demonstrated that constitutional documents are, by their nature, unsuited to making 
comprehensive provision for a legal framework for education (O’Mahony 2008, 141-144). 
For many years, education in Ireland was administered almost entirely on the basis of 
administrative memoranda and policy documents, with no legal provisions to build on 
the constitutional foundation. This was less than ideal, and led to many ambiguities and 
grey areas, not to mention demarcation disputes and bureaucratic wrangling between 
government departments as to who was responsible for various aspects of service 
provision, and associated delays in service delivery to children. Finally, the Education Act 
1998 was enacted to provide a detailed framework for the regulation and funding of the 
primary and secondary education system. This was followed by the Education (Welfare) 
Act 2000, which dealt with issues surrounding school attendance, and the Education for 
Persons with Special Educational Needs Act 2004, which established a dedicated 
framework for making provision for children with special educational needs. 
 
The Education Act 1998 sets out the functions of the Minister for Education in section 7, 
which include making appropriate education available to each person resident in the 
State, determining national education policy, providing funding to schools and 
monitoring the quality, economy, efficiency and effectiveness of the education provided 
in such schools. Section 30 authorizes the Minister to prescribe the school curriculum in 
consultation with patrons of schools, national associations of parents, school 
management organizations and trade unions and staff associations representing teachers. 
Section 10 empowers the Minister to designate schools as recognized schools for the 
purposes of the Act, having regard to a variety of factors, including: the numerical viability 
of the school; local diversity in school provision; whether the needs of students attending 
or likely to attend the school cannot reasonably be met by existing schools; undertakings 
given by the patron regarding curriculum delivery and compliance with inspections and 
regulations; and health and safety compliance. 
 
The Act also gave statutory footing to the patronage model, providing in section 8 that the 
patron of a school is either the person who was recognized as such at the commencement 
of the Act or who applied for recognition of the school, with vocational education 
committees automatically becoming patrons of schools established or maintained by 
them. Patrons are obliged by section 14 to establish a board of management to manage 
the school on their behalf, and are empowered to remove members from the board or, 
where the board is not performing its functions, dissolve the board, either of their own 
initiative or at the direction of the Minister. The Board of Management has a variety of 
functions under the Act, some of which will be discussed in more detail below, and is 
obliged by section 15 to consult with and keep the patron informed of decisions and 
proposals of the board. 
 
The Education (Welfare) Act 2000 makes provision for compulsory school attendance up 
to age 16, as well as for dealing with students who fail to attend school or have been 
excluded from a school on disciplinary grounds. Section 22 of the Act obliges school 
boards of management to prepare a school attendance strategy. The Act established the 
National Educational Welfare Board, which is charged with dealing with all matters 
concerning school attendance, including liaising with schools and parents, 
commissioning and conducting research, and appointing educational welfare officers. 
(The functions of the Board were transferred to the Child and Family Agency by the Child 
and Family Agency Act 2015.) Education welfare officers are required under section 21 to 
be informed by the school of cases of persistent absenteeism, suspensions of more than 6 
days or exclusions. Section 24 requires educational welfare officers to make all reasonable 
efforts to ensure that provision is made for the continued education of a student who is 
excluded from school, including consultation with the principal of the school, the student 
and his parents, and convening a meeting between any or all of such persons as agree to 
attend. Under section 27, the Child and Family Agency is required to make all reasonable 
efforts to have a child who is permanently excluded from a school enrolled in another 
school, or if this is not possible, to make such other arrangements as it considers 
appropriate to ensure that the child receives a certain minimum education. The Agency is 
also obliged to offer advice and assistance to parents who are experiencing difficulty in 
ensuring that their children attend school regularly. 
 
The Education for Persons with Special Educational Needs Act 2004 adds an additional 
layer of law and policy for dealing with children who have special educational needs. The 
Act provides for a variety of mechanisms for initiating an assessment of children who are 
suspected as having special educational needs, including at the instigation of a school 
principal, the Health Services Executive or the National Council for Special Education, or 
at the request of the parents. Where a child is found to have special educational needs, an 
education plan is to be prepared for that child, either by the school or by the National 
Council for Special Education. The Education Plan is to set out details of the child’s special 
educational needs and the provision to be made to meet those needs, and is to be reviewed 
on an annual basis. The Minister for Education is obliged under section 13 to provide the 
resources necessary for the preparation and implementation of education plans. The Act 
establishes the Special Education Appeals Board to provide a quick and informal expert 
dispute resolution body to hear a variety of appeals relating to the procedures established 
by the Act. The 2004 Act represents significant progress in the area of special educational 
needs (O’Mahony 2006, 184-199); unfortunately, although it was initially intended to be 
fully operational by 2009 after a 5-year preparatory period, its full commencement was 
indefinitely postponed following the banking crash of 2008 (O’Mahony 2015). 
Disappointingly, over ten years later, no plans have been announced for re-starting this 
process. The United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child expressed its concern 
about this delay in its concluding observations in 2016 (United Nations Committee on the 
Rights of the Child 2016, §47).  
 
Freedom to establish non-state schools  
 
It was noted above that the vast majority of schools in Ireland are non-State schools, so 
clearly the freedom to establish such schools is strongly protected. Article 42.2 of the Irish 
Constitution expressly provides that parents ‘shall be free to provide… education in their 
homes or in private schools or in schools recognised or established by the State.’ As 
already seen, primary schools in Ireland are exclusively non-State; the manner in which 
the State funds primary education is to fund recognized schools that are established in 
response to parental demand where a sufficient critical mass exists. However, the State is 
clearly entitled to place conditions on such funding; parents are not automatically entitled 
to receive support for a private school established in pursuit of the preference of a group 
of parents. In O’Shiel v Minister for Education (1999), a case concerning an application 
for State funding for a Steiner school, Ms. Justice Laffoy stated that ‘[f]ulfilment of the 
State’s constitutional obligation under Article 42.4 must take account of the parental 
freedom of choice guaranteed by Article 42, but it must be based on arrangements which 
have a rational foundation and prescribe proper criteria for eligibility which accord with 
the purpose of Article 42 and of the provisions of the Constitution generally.’ In that 
particular case, a requirement that teachers at the proposed school be qualified to teach 
the Irish language (which is stated to be the first official language in Article 8 of the 
Constitution, and is a compulsory part of the curriculum) was found to be a permissible 
criterion for funding. As seen above, section 10 of the Education Act 1998 prescribes a 
number of other criteria. 
 
The overwhelming reliance of the primary school system on State-funded private schools 
(which are predominantly denominational in nature), coupled with the absence of a 
universal public alternative provided by the State and the fact that the onus rests on 
parents to establish new schools, has been identified as problematic from the perspective 
of religious liberty and pluralism. Given the limited availability of resources, the effect is 
that members of large religious groups are invariably able to access publicly-funded 
denominational education attuned to their beliefs, whereas members of minority 
religions and of none are only able to do likewise if they are able to muster critical mass 
within a discrete geographical area. Where this is not possible (as it often is not in Ireland, 
given the overwhelming dominance until quite recently of the Catholic faith), many 
families are left with no option other than to avail of a school operating under a religious 
ethos to which they do not subscribe. As will be seen below, this is problematic given the 




As seen above, Article 42.2 of the Irish Constitution equally protects the right to educate 
children at home in addition to the right to establish non-State schools. The main 
qualification on this is contained in Article 42.3.2°, which stipulates that ‘[t]he State shall, 
however, as guardian of the common good, require in view of actual conditions that the 
children receive a certain minimum education, moral, intellectual and social.’ Section 14 
of the Education (Welfare) Act 2000 requires that a register be maintained of all children 
who are receiving education in a place other than a recognized school. Parents wishing to 
educate a child at home must apply to have the child registered; applications are assessed 
by the Child and Family Agency in light of the education being provided, the materials 
being used, and the time being spent in the provision of education, so as to determine 
whether the child is receiving a certain minimum education. The Agency may make such 
registration conditional on complying with specified requirements, or refuse to register 
the child; in cases of refusal, parents are then obliged under section 17 to cause the child 
to attend a recognized school. 
 
The term ‘certain minimum education’ is not defined either in the Constitution or (more 
curiously) in the 2000 Act. In O’Shiel, Ms. Justice Laffoy stated that the ‘certain minimum 
education’ contemplated by Article 42.3.2° is a lower standard of education than the 
primary education which the State is obliged to provide for under Article 42.4. In DPP v 
Best (2000), Mrs. Justice Denham pointed out that since the Constitution is a living 
document to be construed in light of prevailing standards and conditions, the standard 
will vary from time to time. This is a view which is reinforced in Article 42.3.2° by the use 
of the phrase ‘in view of actual conditions’. Mrs. Justice Denham considered that this 
latter phrase encompassed such considerations as the primary school curriculum, the 
circumstances of the child and family involved in a given dispute and the circumstances 
of the community as a whole, including the general educational standard of the times. In 
this regard, the learned judge referred to the prevalence of computers in schools and 
society, thus giving rise to the possibility that a certain degree of computer literacy may 
one day be regarded as a component of the ‘certain minimum education’ required by the 
Constitution. In relation to the actual standard of education contemplated by Article 
42.3.2°, Mrs. Justice Denham stated that it must be ‘conductive to the child achieving 
intellectual and social development and not such as to place the child in a discriminatory 
position.’ Mr. Justice Keane commented that it was not to be equated with the primary 
school curriculum, which was above the constitutional minimum. 
 
A significant issue is whether or not the teaching of the Irish language constitutes an 
integral part of the certain minimum education. In Best, rather than holding that Irish is 
an essential element of the certain minimum education contemplated in Article 42.3.2°, 
or that the State is not entitled to require the teaching of Irish at all, the Supreme Court 
adopted a position somewhere in between these two black and white extremes. Mr. 
Justice Keane stated that ‘it would be going too far to say that its absence would, of itself, 
mean that the constitutional standard had not been reached, since that standard is to be 
determined in view of “actual conditions”…But given the status of Irish as the first official 
language and the fact that a knowledge of it is a precondition to at least some forms of 
employment, it could not be said that its absence from a curriculum cannot be taken into 
account in determining whether the education of the child reaches the constitutional 
standard.’ In that particular case, the absence of Irish language lessons, along with a 
general lack of structure in the curriculum, led to a determination that the children were 
not receiving the required ‘certain minimum education’ at home. 
 
School choice not limited by family income 
 
The discussion to date has shown that freedom of parental choice is at the heart of Article 
42 of the Irish Constitution. In addition to the guarantees discussed above in relation to 
establishing private schools and home schooling, Article 42.3.1° stipulates that ‘[t]he State 
shall not oblige parents in violation of their conscience and lawful preference to send their 
children to schools established by the State, or to any particular type of school designated 
by the State.’ The courts have interpreted these provisions as guaranteeing to parents the 
right to choose the type of school at which their children shall be educated, although not 
necessarily the particular school (Farry 1996, 66 and 78; O’Mahony 2006, 124-125). This 
constitutional right has been bolstered by section 6 of the Education Act 1998, which 
provides that every person concerned with the implementation of the Act shall have 
regard to the objectives of the Act, which include, inter alia, ‘to promote the right of 
parents to send their children to a school of the parents’ choice having regard to the rights 
of patrons and the effective and efficient use of resources’. Clearly, this right will be 
qualified by both the admissions policies of schools and by the availability of resources. 
 
However, it is equally clear from the discussion to date that the lack of religious diversity 
in the primary school system in Ireland is increasingly at odds with the concept of freedom 
of parental choice in contemporary Irish society. As regards income as a factor in parental 
choice, primary education is available free to all, and income level is not a direct factor in 
freedom of choice of school except insofar as it may prevent a family from residing in the 
catchment area of schools in affluent neighborhoods. Where income level becomes more 
relevant at primary level is in its interaction with the restrictions imposed by the 
overwhelmingly denominational nature of the primary school system. Families who are 
not Catholic and cannot (or would prefer not to) avail of the predominant Catholic 
denominational primary schools, may be unable – due to their income level – to establish 
a school of their own or to home school. To put it at its most simple: if you cannot afford 
anything other than what the State is offering for free, then there is over a 90% chance (or 
100% in many rural areas) that you will have to send your children to a Catholic 
denominational school. In this sense, income level may potentially conspire with religion 
to limit the choice of primary schools available to families, which would appear to run 
contrary to the emphasis placed in the constitutional provisions on freedom of parental 
choice of type of school. 
 
In 2012, the Forum on Patronage and Pluralism recommended that 250 schools be 
examined for divestment from Catholic patronage, with 50 to be divested. Even if 
implemented, this would only have effected a 2% swing in the make-up of the Irish 
primary school system. Article 44 of the Irish Constitution includes specific protection for 
the property rights of religious denominations, meaning that the Government has been 
dependent on their co-operation to bring about divestment. Such co-operation has not 
been forthcoming on any meaningful scale. As a result, seven years later, even this rather 
unambitious target has not been met. In 2017, the Government announced plans to 
increase the number of multi-denominational and non-denominational schools from 111 
to 400 by 2030. Achieving this would require a significant increase in the pace of reform; 
and even then, Catholic schools would still account for well over 80% of all primary 
schools. Clearly, the challenges posed by the legacy of Ireland’s historical reliance on 
religious denominations to deliver primary education, and the rapidly changing 
demographic and social trends in Ireland, will not be fully overcome for some time. 
 
At secondary level, the greater diversity of schools means that religion is less of a factor, 
but income level is a more direct factor, since fee-paying private schools are far more 
common than at primary level. Secondary education, while not a constitutionally 
guaranteed right like primary education, is nonetheless available free to all; however, 
families unable to afford the fees charged by private secondary schools will clearly have a 
narrower choice of secondary schools available to them. This is no different to many other 
countries, and is less concerning than the issues raised at primary level, particularly since 
fee-paying private secondary schools account for less than 10% of the schools at that level. 
School distinctiveness protected by law and policy 
 
As the Irish education system has grown up around an assumption that most schools will 
be overtly religious in character, it is unsurprising that the legal framework provides 
extensive protection for the distinctive character – generally referred to as ‘ethos’ – of 
individual schools. At a general level, Article 44.2.5° of the Constitution provides that 
‘[e]very religious denomination shall have the right to manage its own affairs, own, 
acquire and administer property, movable and immovable, and maintain institutions for 
religious or charitable purposes.’ The Education Act 1998 approaches the issue in a 
broader sense, using language that is not exclusively religious in nature. Under section 15, 
a school board of management, in performing its functions, is required to ‘uphold, and be 
accountable to the patron for so upholding, the characteristic spirit of the school as 
determined by the cultural, educational, moral, religious, social, linguistic and spiritual 
values and traditions which inform and are characteristic of the objectives and conduct of 
the school.’ As can be seen, religion is just one of a variety of factors which may determine 
the characteristic spirit of a school (although ‘moral’ and ‘spiritual’ factors will clearly be 
cognate to religion). 
 
Section 15 also stipulates that school admissions policies must have regard to the school’s 
characteristic spirit, and even the Minister for Education is required to have regard to a 
school’s characteristic spirit when performing his functions under section 30 with respect 
to prescribing the curriculum. More specifically, the Minister is also required to ‘ensure 
that the amount of instruction time to be allotted to subjects on the curriculum as 
determined by the Minister in each school day shall be such as to allow for such 
reasonable instruction time, as the board with the consent of the patron determines, for 
subjects relating to or arising from the characteristic spirit of the school’. More detailed 
provision relating to the protection of the religious ‘ethos’ of religious schools has been 
made with respect to both pupil admissions and teacher employment, as will be discussed 
in the next two sections. 
 
Decisions about admitting pupils 
 
School admissions are a matter for individual schools in Ireland, although the legal 
regulation of this issue has been increasing in recent years. The Education Act 1998 
requires schools to establish and maintain an admissions policy which provides for 
maximum accessibility to the school (section 9) and which respects principles of inclusion 
and equality (section 15). The policy should also have regard to the right of parents to 
send children to the school of the parents’ choice and to the characteristic spirit of the 
school (section 15). A refusal by a school to admit a child can be appealed by the parents 
of the child to an appeals committee appointed by the Minister for Education (sections 
29-29F). The role of the courts in this area is quite limited; in Ó hÚallacháin v Burke 
(1988), Mr. Justice Murphy held that the sole function of the courts in any such dispute 
is to determine whether the decision of the Board was reached on a fair and rational basis; 
the courts will not under any circumstances substitute their judgment for that of the 
Board. 
 
The Education (Admissions to Schools Act) 2018 inserted a new Part X into the Education 
Act 1998, providing by far the most detailed legal regulation of school admissions in 
Ireland to date. Section 61 requires schools to include in their admissions policies a 
statement that school admissions shall not discriminate on grounds of gender, civil or 
family status, sexual orientation, religion, disability or special educational needs, race or 
membership of the Traveller community (subject to certain exceptions). Section 62 
provides additional detail on the format and content of admissions policies. It specifically 
precludes a number of admission criteria which have potential for indirectly 
discriminatory impact, such as waiting lists or priority for children of past pupils (which 
would work to the disadvantage of immigrants or anyone who has recently moved to an 
area). Section 64 prohibits schools other than designated fee-charging schools from 
charging fees or seeking payments or contributions (howsoever described) as a condition 
of an application for admission, admission or continued enrolment. 
 
In addition to Part X of the 1998 Act, further regulation of school admissions is set down 
in the Equal Status Act 2000, section 7 of which requires that educational establishments 
shall not discriminate on any of ten separate grounds in relation to the admission or the 
terms and conditions of admission of a person as a student in the establishment. The 
grounds of discrimination set out in section 3 of the Act are gender, marital status, family 
status, sexual orientation, religion, age, disability, race, membership of the Traveller 
community and victimisation. Like Part X of the Education Act 1998, section 7 contains 
exemptions to the gender ground for schools that cater to one gender only, and to the 
disability ground where admitting a student would have a seriously detrimental effect on 
the provision of services to other students. 
 
In the case of religious discrimination, section 7 originally included an exemption for 
cases where denominational schools admit coreligionists in preference to non-
coreligionists, or where they refuse to admit a non-coreligionist (provided that such 
refusal is reasonably necessary to uphold the ethos of the school). Empirical evidence 
indicated that there was a low incidence of schools exercising the right to refuse admission 
on grounds of religion, but that it was common for denominational schools to give priority 
to children from their own religion and to request a baptismal certificate as part of an 
admission application. In urban areas where schools are oversubscribed, this provision, 
combined with the predominance of Catholic schools, often made it difficult for non-
Catholics to secure a school place within a reasonable distance of their home. A related 
effect was that many parents (mostly lapsed Catholics) had their children baptized for the 
purpose of securing a school place, where otherwise they would have chosen not to 
(Mawhinney 2009, 135-142; Quinn 2010). This clearly raised serious concerns from the 
perspective of religious freedom, since State education policy is generating an insidious 
pressure on some parents to (at least superficially) convert to and practise a religion that 
does not conform with their beliefs. 
 
Following extensive lobbying by civil society groups, the Education (Admissions to 
Schools Act) 2018 amended the Equal Status Act 2000 to significantly narrow the scope 
of the exemption to the prohibition on religions discrimination. Schools can now only give 
priority in admissions to students of a certain religion if they are either fully private 
schools not in receipt of State funding, or if they are catering for a minority religion 
(defined as less than 10% of the population). The practical effect of this is that Catholic 
schools can no longer give preference to Catholic students, with the logic being that 
Catholic schools are so predominant that no situation could arise whereby a Catholic 
family would be unable to access a Catholic school, whereas a Protestant family (for 
example) might not be able to access another Protestant school if their child was refused 
admission to the nearest one. The separate provision allowing schools to refuse to admit 
a non-coreligionist where it is proved that the refusal is essential to maintain the ethos of 
the school remains in place; as noted above, this has rarely been invoked to date, and it 
remains to be seen whether schools might seek to invoke it more frequently now that the 
rule on preference in cases of oversubscription has been narrowed to such an extent. 
 
Separate provisions govern the admission of children with special educational needs. 
Section 2 of the Education for Persons with Special Educational Needs Act 2004 
establishes a presumption that children with special educational needs shall be educated 
in mainstream schools except where the nature and degree of the child’s needs are such 
that to do so would be inconsistent with the best interests of the child (as determined in 
an assessment of his educational needs) or the effective provision of education for other 
children. Under section 10 of the Act (which remains uncommenced), the parents of a 
child in respect of whom an education plan has been prepared are permitted to request 
the National Council for Special Education to designate a school in the plan. In making 
any such designation, the Council is to have regard to the needs of the child concerned, 
the wishes of the child’s parents and the capacity of the school to accommodate the child 
and to meet his needs. Section 10 specifically provides that the school shall admit the child 
as a student upon being directed by the Council to do so. Parents are given a right of 
appeal to the Special Education Appeals Board if their requested school is not designated; 
conversely, the board of management can appeal against the designation of their school 
in an education plan, or appeal for the level of additional resources for the school 
stipulated in a child’s education plan to be increased. This is just one of many examples 
of provisions of the 2004 Act which are well drafted and have potential to make a positive 
impact, if only the Government would take the final step of commencing the legislation. 
 
Decisions about staff 
 
As with pupil admissions, the hiring and firing of teachers is a matter for individual 
schools.  
In 2009, in a case concerning the liability of the State for sexual abuse committed by a 
teacher, the Supreme Court confirmed that teachers are, in the eyes of the law, the 
employees of the school and not of the State, and that the State has no role in either hiring 
or firing teachers (albeit that the Department of Education could effectively bring about 
a teacher’s dismissal if it withdrew its recognition of that teacher). The corollary of this is 
that the State was found to have no vicarious liability for the abuse committed by the 
teacher, a point which was criticized in light of the lengthy history of child abuse in 
educational institutions in Ireland and the failure of the State to take effective child 
protection measures to prevent same (O’Mahony, 2009). In 2014, the European Court of 
Human Rights held that while the State was not vicariously liable for the teacher’s actions, 
it was directly liable for its own inactions in failing to implement an effective child 
protection framework (O’Mahony & Kilkelly, 2014). 
 
The law regulating discrimination in teacher employment is quite similar to that on pupil 
admissions. The Employment Equality Act 1998 prohibits discrimination in employment 
matters on the same grounds (with the exception of the victimization ground), but section 
37 of the Act permits denominational schools to engage in religious discrimination – in 
both hiring and firing – where reasonably necessary to uphold the ethos of the school. 
When these provisions were referred to the Supreme Court to test their constitutionality 
on judicial preview, the Court reiterated the point made in earlier case law that it is 
constitutionally permissible to create a legislative distinction on grounds of religion if this 
is necessary – but only insofar as is necessary – to give effect to the guarantee of free 
profession and practise of religion. The Court thus held that provisions allowing for 
religious discrimination against teachers may be permitted if reasonably necessary to 
protect the free practise of religion of those who seek to have their children educated 
through a particular religious ethos, with the question of what is to be deemed ‘reasonably 
necessary’ being an objective test to be determined on a case-to-case basis (Re Article 26 
and the Employment Equality Bill, 1996 (1997)). 
 
Given that the overwhelming majority of schools in Ireland operate under a Catholic ethos 
(particularly at primary level), this provision gave rise to potential flashpoints in relation 
to a variety of issues, including teachers who are cohabitees, divorcees or homosexuals, 
and whose lifestyle could potentially be seen as undermining the ethos of the school. In 
the only case on point to come before the courts (under older legislation), a school was 
found to be entitled to dismiss a teacher who was in a cohabiting relationship with a 
separated married man (Flynn v Power (1985)). Given the overwhelmingly 
denominational nature of the Irish primary school system, the majority of teachers work 
in denominational schools; and research has documented the fact that teachers felt 
pressured to avoid disclosing lifestyle details which may be seen to conflict with the ethos 
of the school in which they teach (Mawhinney 2009, 166-176). 
 
In the same year that Ireland introduced marriage equality, section 11 of the Equality 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2015 amended the 1998 Act to provide that publicly-
funded denominational schools could only discriminate against their staff on grounds of 
religion in situations where ‘the religion or belief of the employee or prospective employee 
constitutes a genuine, legitimate and justified occupational requirement having regard to 
the institution’s ethos’. The discriminatory action must be ‘objectively justified by the 
institution’s aim of preventing the undermining of the religious ethos of the institution’, 
and the means of achieving that aim must be appropriate and necessary. This test will 
only be met where the action taken is proportionate, ‘rationally and strictly related to the 
institution’s religious ethos’, and is a response to conduct undermining the religious ethos 
of the institution rather than a response to that employee’s or prospective employee’s 
status. The intention of this amendment was to avoid a situation where (for example) a 
Catholic denominational school could seek to legally dismiss a gay teacher simply because 
they got married to a person of the same sex. No cases have yet arisen that have tested the 
limits of this amendment. 
 
Accountability for school quality  
 
Section 13 of the Education Act 1998 establishes the education inspectorate, with the Minister 
being obliged to appoint a Chief Inspector and so many inspectors as the Minister considers 
appropriate. The functions of an inspector include supporting and advising recognized schools; 
visiting schools to evaluate the organization and operation of those schools and the quality and 
effectiveness of the education provided there, including the quality of teaching and effectiveness 
of individual teachers; reporting to the Minister, the patron, the board of management and the 
teachers on such matters; advising teachers and boards of management on the performance of 
their duties; and advising parents and parents’ associations. The Act provides that  an Inspector 
shall have all such powers as are necessary or expedient for the purpose of performing his or her 
functions and shall be accorded every reasonable facility and co-operation by the board and the 
staff of a school. 
 
Teaching of values  
 
In light of the discussion which has taken place above, it is clear that the teaching of values 
plays a major role in Irish schools, and most particularly in denominational primary 
schools, which account for approximately 95% of all primary schools in Ireland. It was 
seen above that Article 42.1 of the Irish Constitution guarantees to parents the right to 
provide for the religious, moral, intellectual, physical and social education of their 
children, while Article 44.2.4° provides for the right of children to attend a school 
receiving public funds without attending religious instruction at that school. In addition 
to this, the Education Act 1998 specifies in section 30 that the Minister, in prescribing the 
curriculum, shall not require any student to attend instruction in any subject which is 
contrary to the conscience of the parent of the student or in the case of a student who has 
reached the age of 18 years, the student. Rule 69 of the 1965 Rules for National School 
(which remains in force) provides that ‘[n]o pupil shall receive, or be present at, any 
religious instruction of which his parents or guardians disapprove’, and that ‘[t]he periods 
of formal religious instruction shall be fixed so as to facilitate the withdrawal of pupils’ 
from such instruction. 
 
In theory, therefore, this exemption mechanism means that the many children and 
parents in Ireland who avail of denominational schools operating under a religious ethos 
to which they do not subscribe are still guaranteed their rights under Articles 42 and 44 
of the Constitution with respect to religious freedom in education. However, for many 
years, the reality was rather different, due to another provision of the Rules of National 
School – Rule 68 – which established what was known as the ‘integrated curriculum’: 
  
‘Of all the parts of a school curriculum Religious Instruction is by far the most 
important, as its subject-matter, God’s honour and service, includes the proper use 
of all man’s faculties, and affords the most powerful inducements to their proper 
use. Religious instruction is, therefore, a fundamental part of the school course, 
and a religious spirit should inform and vivify the whole work of the school.’  
 
Rule 68 went on to state that the teacher ‘should constantly inculcate’ various Catholic 
values in their students and that the primary duty of the educator is to habituate the 
students to observe the laws of God. Under this structure, the predominant approach was 
that while Irish primary schools delivered 30 minutes per day of formally timetabled 
religious instruction, religious values permeated the entire school day. 
 
The integrated curriculum made it impossible for a child to attend the vast majority of 
primary schools in Ireland without being exposed to, and influenced by, Catholic 
teachings. This system quite obviously impinged on the religious freedom of non-Catholic 
children and parents within the education system – and yet the scant case law that exists 
in this area to date would seem to indicate that the courts did not consider this to be 
unconstitutional. In Campaign to Separate Church and State Ltd v Minister for 
Education (1998), Mr. Justice Barrington examined this issue and stated: 
 
‘The Constitution therefore distinguishes between religious “education” and 
religious “instruction” – the former being the much wider term. A child who 
attends a school run by a religious denomination different from his own may have 
a constitutional right not to attend religious instruction at that school, but the 
Constitution cannot protect him from being influenced, to some degree, by the 
religious ‘ethos’ of the school. A religious denomination is not obliged to change 
the general atmosphere of its school merely to accommodate a child of a different 
religious persuasion who wishes to attend that school.’  
 
When read in the isolated context of a constitutionally sanctioned system of non-
discriminatory State funding for denominational education, this passage is 
unobjectionable; however, the empirical reality of the overwhelmingly denominational 
nature of the Irish primary school system, combined with the operation of the integrated 
curriculum, had the effect that it was virtually impossible for some parents and children 
to fully exercise their rights with respect to religious freedom in education. They were 
faced with no realistic freedom of choice of school, an issue which was compounded by a 
partial and ineffective opt-out mechanism that left the children subject to a significant 
degree of religious influence, raising questions regarding compliance with the decision of 
the European Court of Human Rights in Folgerø v Norway (2007). Given the small 
number of multi-denominational schools available, and the fact that these are 
concentrated in the major cities, the only possibility of non-Catholics avoiding exposure 
to Catholic denominational education would have been through the establishment by 
their parents of a private school or through home education (neither of which may be 
practicable in many cases). 
 
Empirical research (Mawhinney 2009) confirmed the challenges presented by the 
combination of the integrated curriculum with the de facto denominational nature of the 
Irish primary school system. A typical comment from one of the parents interviewed was 
that ‘religion is not a subject that they do for a half-hour. It’s constantly brought up again 
and again like prayers here and there, colouring in pictures, say of the nativity. It was 
24/7!’ The teachers interviewed confirmed this impression, with one stating that ‘[i]t 
would be near nigh impossible’ for a child to effectively opt out. Perhaps more serious still 
evidence suggesting that an opt-out of even timetabled religious instruction was often not 
available in any meaningful way, with children left to amuse themselves in the library or 
sometimes in the same classroom due to a lack of resources. In some cases, schools only 
allowed an opt-out if the parents collected the child from school (which is often 
impractical). These facts are reinforced by clear evidence that parents who did not wish 
their child to be exposed to doctrinal religious instruction were reluctant to exercise 
whatever opt-out was available due to fears concerning their child being stigmatized or 
even bullied by other pupils or by teachers. 
 
The report of the Forum on Patronage and Pluralism in 2012 recommended that Rule 68 
be abolished, and this recommendation was implemented by a Department of Education 
Circular in 2016. However, it is unclear what the response on the ground has been in 
denominational schools, and whether this has resolved all issues relating to 
accommodating children from other religious backgrounds. The legislative provision 
discussed above protecting school ethos still allow denominational schools to have an 
overtly religious ethos or characteristic spirit, which will inevitably have implications 
outside of timetabled religious instruction. Moreover, there is still evidence that effective 
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